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I. INTRODUCTION 
Xenotransplantation highlights conflicting interests in the health of the public between a 
specific interest in enhancing the health of those individuals who require a (xeno)transplant, 
and a wider interest in protecting the health of us all by avoiding infectious diseases which 
may be transmitted across the species barrier and then to others following such a procedure.  
There is also a third type of public interest which comes into play here - the interest in 
advancing medical knowledge and treatment. Given the significant shortage of organs for 
transplantation,
1
 the continued development of xenotransplantation could be a means of 
addressing the shortfall and thereby serving all three interests.  Interest in the health of 
individuals is at the heart of all health care systems and, in some countries, has been used to 
support, not always successfully, ideas of individual rights to particular health care 
treatments, or procedures and individual autonomy regarding health.
2
 Whilst the precedence 
given to individual rights and autonomy has been questioned judicially, and in legal and 
bioethical literature,
3
 bioethics frameworks do not tend to tackle public health dilemmas and 
the conflicts that arise when some individuals behave in a way that affects others.
4
  This 
                                                          
* Law School, Lancaster University.  A version of this paper was presented to a Lancaster University Centre for 
Bioethics and Medical Law seminar on Exploring Health Care Law’s Recognition of Autonomy and Rights held 
in March 2009.  We are grateful to participants for their comments and the insightful debate which followed.  
Thanks also to the anonymous reviewers and to José Miola and Hazel Biggs for their comments. 
1
 For statistics from 1 April 2008-31 March 2009 see http://www.uktransplant.org.uk/ukt/statistics/statistics.jsp. 
2
 See, for example, R (on the application of Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45; R (on the application of Burke) v 
GMC [2005] EWCA Civ 1003; R v Cambridge DHA, ex p B [1995] 2 All ER 129. 
3
 For example, R v Collins and another, ex parte Brady (2000) 58 BMLR 173; J Coggon, ’Varied and Principled 
Understandings of Autonomy in English Law: Justifiable Inconsistency or Blinkered Moralism?’ (2007) 15 
Health  Care Analysis 235.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
4
 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Public Health: Ethical Issues (2007) Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 145 and 
xvi.  For criticisms of this report see J Coggon, ‘Harmful Rights-Doing? The Perceived Problem of Liberal 
Paradigms and Public Health’ (2008) 34 Journal of Medical Ethics 798. 
2 
 
paper explores how matters of private benefit and public risk can be appropriately reconciled 




Others have noted the tensions raised by xenotransplantation;
6
 however, much of the debate 
concedes that risks to xeno-recipients and others may exist but then focuses on managing 
those harms.
7
  We take a step back and explore whether ideas of public health need to take a 
central role when answering the question of whether clinical xenotransplantation should 
proceed.  In doing so, we consider whether priority should be afforded to the private and 
public interest in the possible benefit to the individual who requires a xenotransplant, or to 
the risk of harm to all of us caused by introducing a new human pathogen into the 
community. We explore whether the public interest requires that preventative measures are 
taken in advance because xenotransplantation poses a threat to public health, and argue that 
the interests of the individual requiring a xenotransplant must be weighed with more 
collectivist concerns for public health.  In this we are persuaded by the argument that 
proportionality is more appropriate in risk contexts, and more respectful of human rights.
8
  
This is of particular note for xenotransplantation given the surveillance and monitoring 




Whilst we are primarily concerned with the first two interests noted above, the health of 
individuals and public health, it is axiomatic to say that there is also an interest in the 
advancement of science and medicine, for many of us and those we love and care for may not 
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be here today without the development of what are now seen as mundane drugs, treatments or 
procedures, such as antibiotics, chemotherapy or organ transplants.  At one point in their 
development, a decision was made to clinically proceed with these advances because, 
presumably, the benefit which could be attained if successful would exceed any side-effects 
or risks.  There is the “technological imperative”,10 the drive to continue to develop drugs, 
procedures, treatments and techniques and, for some, the “seductive sirens of medical 
progress” may be hard to ignore.11  At the same time such progress needs to take account of a 
wider perspective - just because something can technically be done does not necessarily or 
automatically mean that it should be. Indeed, some proposed medical advances may pose too 
great a risk to the potential recipient and others, raising questions as to whether they should 
be clinically introduced.  However, the reality and implications of adopting this position may 
make it harder to implement.  Who wants to be the one to tell those on the transplant waiting 
list that research on the developing biotechnology they have seen reported in the press has 
been halted because there might be risks to others?  Despite these difficult discussions, we 
support Sommerville’s argument that: 
 
… the new science has moved us from chance to choice in many matters … With 
choice comes the responsibility to use that choice ethically.  Doing so requires two 
kinds of courage: the courage to go forward with the new science and technology 
when it is morally and ethically acceptable to do so, and the courage to exercise 
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It is at this point that an interest in the health of the public and an interest in the health of the 
individual may conflict, with this tension exacerbated by the interest in advancing medicine 
which may benefit all or any one of us. 
 
The concept of risk is central to our analysis given that the consequences of 
xenotransplantation are events of the future; it is a biotechnology that threatens and promises 
potential future harm as well as possible benefit. There is much critical literature on risk, the 
logic of risk and the repercussions of a focus on risk in contemporary society.
13
  A 
widespread fear of risk has arguably made it easier to rely on knowledge of the possible risks 
a phenomenon poses to justify preventative (legal) action to forestall harm.
14
  Yet when it 
comes to the question of whether to utilise a biotechnology that may have a significant 
impact on individuals and society, risks of harm cannot and should not be ignored.  We do 
not pretend that the risks posed by xenotransplantation are certain, but the nature of the harm 
to public health that this biotechnology could unleash is severe.  We argue that it is 
sometimes legally and ethically necessary for the state to act to protect the health of the 
public, and that xenotransplantation is a case in point.  Some have suggested that because of 
the risk of possible harm, the public should be consulted about using xenotransplantation 
and/or that the non-human animals, the xeno-recipients and, possibly, others should be 
subject to surveillance and monitoring schemes pre- and post-xenotransplant. However, we 
go further.
15
  Because of the limited evidence that xenotransplants will be a viable solution to 
the organ shortage problem (benefit), and the extreme risks of harm that accompany this 
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biotechnology, it should not proceed to clinical trials.  Our conclusion is supported by our 
modification of the precautionary principle with Mill’s harm principle to aid us in 
determining how the tension in the different notions of public health can be addressed. 
 
Our paper is split into seven sections.  We first set out the risks of xenotransplantation, results 
of pre-clinical and clinical trials, and how it is regulated in the UK.  We then outline the 
model of risk we have adopted, before discussing how interests in the health of the public and 
in public health are called into play by this developing biotechnology.  In the final three 
sections we explore and then apply our two key principles (precautionary and harm) to the 
risks of xenotransplantation. 
 
II. XENOTRANSPLANTATION 
In the UK, xenotransplantation is defined as: 
 
… any procedure that involves the transplantation, implantation, or infusion into a 
human recipient of either live tissues or organs retrieved from animals, or, human 
body fluids, cells, tissues or organs that have undergone ex vivo contact with live non-




This biotechnology has been developed because of the shortfall in the number of human 
organs available for transplantation worldwide.  It is hoped that if a xenotransplant proves 
able to support human life, then a consistent supply of pig organs, cells and tissues can be 
genetically engineered for transplantation in to humans.  Research into cellular 
xenotransplantation is also proceeding. Our focus is on solid organ xenotransplantation as no 
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such genetically engineered organ has yet been xenotransplanted from a pig to a human.  For 
this to occur three main scientific barriers must be overcome, immunological, physiological 




A. Microbiological barriers to xenotransplantation – the risk 
The immunological and physiological barriers to xenotransplantation focus on the pig or the 
human xeno-recipient individually, and whilst there is a risk of transmitting infectious 
diseases following an allotransplant, these are predominantly limited to the individual organ 
recipient.
18
  In contrast, the microbiological barriers to xenotransplantation may go further as 
there is an inherent risk of transmitting infectious diseases from the pig to the xeno-recipient 
and, possibly, on to her close contacts and the wider public.  The problem is that ‘when one 
tests animal-to-human transplants, one is also carrying out another, unwanted, experiment – 
testing the remote but real danger that animal viruses might jump to humans and cause man-
made pandemics’.19 
 
There are two main types of infectious diseases which may be transmitted to the xeno-
recipient and possibly others – known and unknown diseases.  During the 1990s it was 
discovered that porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERVs) could infect human cells in vitro 
and, under certain circumstances, actively infect human cells, meaning they can replicate and 
spread to other cells in the patient.  As such, they have been the focus of concern.  PERVs are 
present in multiple copies in every pig genome, have been linked to cancers of the blood, 
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conditions involving an impaired immune system, and neurodegenerative disorders.
20
  
Retroviruses are dangerous because although they may be harmless in the host non-human 
animal they are potentially lethal once transferred cross-species.  HIV is a retrovirus.  PERVs 
are also capable of recombination with viruses from the host species, raising fears that such 
recombination could ‘generate viruses with novel mechanisms of virulence’.21  And 
‘[e]vidence from naturally occurring retroviral zoonosis and cross-species infections by 
animal retroviruses, for example, HIV, provides a basis for reasoned speculation on the risk 
posed by PERVs.  In a worst case scenario xenograft-related PERV transmission would be 
the starting point of a new viral disease resulting in a public health problem’.22 
 
The dangers of PERVs may be difficult to categorise definitively, but experiences with other 
retroviruses indicate they are unlikely to be responsible for flu-like symptoms; rather, a 
higher order of fluid-borne infectious disease affecting the immune system or blood is 
anticipated.  The consequences of PERVs are also hard to identify but we can reasonably 
speculate that, given our experiences with HIV, xenotransplantation may introduce a lethal 
infectious disease pandemic.  It is unclear whether PERVs represent a small risk to many or a 
high risk to a few, but it is clear that ‘the risk of PERV infection following 
[xenotransplantation] will never be zero.’23 
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The ability of PERVs to cause disease is not known and the nature, existence and means for 
detecting them the subject of research,
24
 but animal retroviruses have adapted and spread 
within the human population and there is ‘mounting evidence that both [Human T cell 
Lymphotropic Virus] and HIV entered the human population through multiple interspecies 
transmission events, from nonhuman primates.’25  There are precedents for other forms of 
cross-species disease transmission, often with devastating results, including swine flu, Ebola, 
and new variant Creutzfeld-Jacob disease.  In their report for the UK’s Department of Health, 
Muir and Griffin list 26 RNA viruses and seven DNA viruses which may pose an infection 
risk to xeno-recipients.  The risk of spreading an infectious disease following a 
xenotransplant (from the xeno-recipient and then to others) will depend on a number of 
factors including the identification of the existence of infectious diseases which are capable 
of replication and transmission, the nature and length of exposure to the disease, the health of 
those involved and the status of their immune system. 
 
To date there is no evidence that PERVs have been transmitted to human recipients of pig 
cells or tissues,
26
 but the studies have been criticised for, amongst other things, limited 
exposure times to the cells and tissues, not being long-term studies of immunosuppressed 
recipients
27
 and, crucially, no human recipients of genetically engineered solid pig organs 
have been studied as no such xenotransplants have been performed.  Thus, ‘the studies do not 
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fully capture the risk of transmission and offer a limited possibility to extrapolate the findings 
to future clinical xenotransplantation of whole organs’.28 
 
Alongside these retroviruses, there are bacteria, fungi, parasites and other viral pathogens 
which may be transmitted following any transplant,
29
 but some of these may be minimised or 
eliminated by breeding the pigs in specific-pathogen free facilities, selective breeding, or 
early weaning,
30
 but this is not possible for PERVs as there are multiple copies of these 
retroviruses in every pig genome.  Nevertheless, some have suggested that PERVs can be 
controlled
31
, and others that the infectious risks can only be reliably determined by allowing 
clinical trials.
32
  At the Congress of the International Xenotransplantation Association in 2007 
there was said to be a consensus that as long as there was ‘appropriate monitoring’, PERVs 
should not prevent clinical trials.
33
   
 
The second risk from xenotransplantation is perhaps even more worrying, with Sykes stating 
that ‘the greatest remaining risk comes from non-PERV unknown viruses that may be non-
pathogenic in source animals but could adapt and become pathogenic in immunosuppressed 
humans’.34  Muir and Griffin highlighted examples of recent ‘emerging and imported 
infections’, including Nipah virus and swine hepatitis E virus,35 and noted that there were 
‘[c]ertain porcine viruses [which] may have the potential, if given the opportunity, to infect 
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new host species ... through a process of adaptation, even though human infection has, as yet, 
never been observed.’36  They also describe other organisms which are known to infect pigs 
but which do not occur in the UK otherwise than via rare imported cases.
37
  Emerging 
infectious diseases have also been recently identified in allotransplants.
38
  Such unknowns are 
problematic, not least because our ability to detect them could be hampered by the fact that 
they may be unidentified (unidentifiable?) for some years after a genetically engineered solid 
organ pig-to-human xenotransplant has been performed.  Identification may not occur for 
several generations after the initial xenotransplant and, by then, the undetected diseases could 
have spread to the wider community. 
 
Although the precise nature and extent of the infectious disease risks posed by 
xenotransplantation are unclear, regulators have acknowledged their presence and outlined 
surveillance and monitoring regimes with which xeno-recipients and their close contacts must 
comply.
39
  The existence and content of these regimes indicate that the risks of 
xenotransplantation are not to be taken lightly and are viewed as more than minimal.  For 
example, in the US it has been proposed that those receiving a xenotransplant and their 
‘intimate contacts’40 should ‘defer indefinitely’ from donating whole blood, blood 
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 and that as an ‘interim precautionary measure ... tissues, breast milk, ova, 
sperm, or any other body parts for use in humans’ are also not donated.42  Xeno-recipients 
who may consider reproduction in the future should be aware that there may be a ‘potential 
risk of transmission of xenogeneic infectious agents not only to their partner but also to their 
offspring during conception, embryonic/fetal development and/or breast-feeding.’43  Xeno-
recipients should be the subject of life-long surveillance ‘for adverse clinical events 
potentially associated with xenogeneic infections’, with biologic specimens archived for 50 
years post-xenotransplant,
44
 and a complete autopsy when the xeno-recipient dies is also 
‘important.’45 
 
B. Pre-clinical and clinical trials of xenotransplantation 
Pre-clinically, non-human primates have received genetically engineered pig solid organ 
xenotransplants and it has been reported that an orthotopic life supporting heart 
xenotransplant has survived for 57 days,
46
 a liver for eight days,
47
 and a kidney for 90 days.
48
  
On the face of it limited survival times have been achieved, but for Petersen et al., 
‘significant progress’ has been made, the results indicate that some of the barriers to 
xenotransplantation may have been overcome, and the time for clinical trials is 
approaching.
49
  However, whilst Sykes is fairly optimistic about the prospects and timing of 
clinical xenotransplants, she also acknowledges that ‘we have not yet achieved long-term 
life-supporting xenograft survival in primates, so we have little information about physiologic 
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barriers or infectious risks in this setting.’50  Clinically, nine months is the longest a human 
has survived with a non-human animal solid organ, in this case a chimpanzee kidney.
51
.  A 
baboon’s heart has supported human life for 20 days,52 and a baboon’s liver has survived for 
70 days.
53
  But there has been no report of a solid organ non-human animal to human 
xenotransplant since 1993
54
 and, crucially, a genetically engineered pig solid organ is yet to 
be xenotransplanted into a human. 
 
As the barriers to xenotransplantation have yet to be pre-clinically addressed, there is limited 
evidence that genetically engineered pigs will be a source of viable organs.  It is not known 
whether such an organ will be able to support the life of a human, neither is it clear what risks 
the xeno-recipient and others may be exposed to.  Despite these uncertainties, researchers 
continue to work towards clinical trials, with some suggesting these are ‘imminent’.55  It is 
thus essential to consider the more theoretical question of whether to allow trials which may 
benefit a few but jeopardise the health of many more and, first, the practical question of how, 
if permitted, such trials are regulated. 
 
C. The Regulation of Xenotransplantation in the UK 
Between 1997 and 2006 xenotransplantation in the UK was regulated by the United Kingdom 
Xenotransplantation Interim Regulatory Authority (UKXIRA),
56
 but on 12 December 2006 
the DH announced that UKXIRA had ceased to exist and new guidance on the biotechnology 
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  In the UK, xenotransplantation should now only occur if there is ‘an adequate 
regulatory framework in place’, infection transmission from non-human to human animal is 
minimised and patients are traced and subject to ongoing surveillance.
58
  It is recommended 
that all xenotransplants are carried out within a research context, with a research protocol and 
appropriate approval from a research ethics committee obtained, because ‘the well-being of 
the individuals concerned, and the safety of the public in general, must be foremost in the 
consideration of any proposal to undertake a xenotransplantation procedure’.59  The guidance 
makes it clear that there are three different scenarios in which a xenotransplant may be 
performed in the UK: (i) under a clinical trial within the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical 
Trials) Regulations 2004, (ii) as research involving NHS patients which falls outside of the 
2004 Regulations, or (iii) as experimental medicine, defined as ‘a clinician offer[ing] a 
particular course of treatment tailored to a particular patient’s needs, either a brand new 
treatment or a new use of a drug or product licensed for use in other ways’.60  With regards to 
the latter, the guidance suggests that those considering offering xenotransplantation as 
experimental treatment outside a research framework “take public health issues and long-
term health surveillance of patients into account”.61 
 
III. OUR MODEL OF RISK 
Even though a solution to the chronic shortage of organs available for transplantation is 
needed, the promise of this biotechnology is unclear, uncertain and its use potentially risky.  
But what does this mean?  The concept of risk is employed in numerous ways and attributed 
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  Non-technically, it refers to the possibility that an undesirable 
consequence might occur.
63
  When risk is coupled with uncertainty, further definitional 
difficulties occur.  In some theories a distinction is drawn between uncertainty and risk, so if 
a number of events may occur following a course of action, but the likelihood of their 
occurrence is unknown, the situation is presented as one of uncertainty.  If the possible events 
that may occur are known as well as the probabilities of their occurring, the situation can be 
characterised as involving risks.
64
  Such a distinction is misleading.  To refer to a course of 
action as posing a risk of harm necessarily implies some degree of uncertainty.
65
  Whilst 
knowing the probability of a known possible outcome makes it a more concrete risk, 
uncertainty will remain in terms of whether it will actually occur and all of its consequences.  
Moreover, simply because there is a higher level of uncertainty about the probability of a 
possible outcome occurring, this does not move it from a risk to an uncertainty because so 
long as it may occur, it remains a risk.  A risk must involve an element of uncertainty in order 
for it to be a risk.
66
  Definitionally, it does not matter that some risks are more certain than 
others.  Thus, the fact that the potential negative outcomes of xenotransplantation are 
uncertain does not preclude describing these possible outcomes as risks. 
 
The language of risk is, however, problematic as risk can refer to (i) the negative outcome 
itself, (ii) the probability of a certain negative outcome, (iii) adopting a hazardous course of 
action, or (iv) endangering something.  So, (i) lung cancer is the risk of smoking, (ii) there is 
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a real risk that smoking could lead to lung cancer, (iii) those who smoke run the risk of lung 
cancer in later life, or (iv) those who smoke risk their health.  We primarily utilise risk in the 
first and second senses, as our understanding of xenotransplantation and its risks leads us to 
consider that moving to clinical trials presents uncertain risks of a grave nature.  
Xenotransplantation creates an environment of ‘manufactured risk’67, risk which is created by 
the progression of science and (bio)technology; risk that we have no prior experience of that 
enables us to calculate the probability of negative outcomes occurring. 
 
Our model of risk also draws upon the logic of lesser harms: it is legitimate to proceed with a 
medical innovation if the risks it poses are lower than the risks of the condition which the 
innovation is intended to treat.
68
  Thus, research should not progress to clinical trials if the 
risks of it are too serious.
69
  With xenotransplantation, there is more than a risk that the 
individual who needs a xenotransplant will die without a transplant; this is the likelihood, if 
not the certainty.
70
  If it were simply a case of balancing this likelihood against the risks of 
having a xenotransplant as part of a clinical trial, then xenotransplantation would win.  The 
risk of death posed by a xenotransplant also comes with a chance of survival, no matter how 
slight, and even if death results as a consequence this is no different than the probable 
outcome of the individual’s condition.  But when considering the risks posed by moving to 
clinical trials, account must surely also be taken of risks to others and the potential benefits to 
society by enhancing medical knowledge and potentially finding a solution to the shortage of 
organs for transplantation.  However, it is increasingly being perceived to be morally 
impermissible for scientists to knowingly expose the public to manufactured risks,
71
 and the 
moral impermissibility of this must, in part, be dependent on how great the risk is.  According 
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to Gostin, measures taken to protect public health should be based on significant risks not just 
‘speculative, theoretical, or remote’ ones, and in order to assess the level of a risk, account 





Although we cannot measure or quantify the risks involved in clinical xenotransplantation, it 
is surely more dangerous to proceed in the face of the possible risks of it than not to because: 
 
[i]f the recognition of a risk is denied on the basis of an ‘unclear’ state of information, 
this means that the necessary counteractions are neglected and the danger grows.  By 
turning up the scientific standard of accuracy, the circle of recognized risks justifying 





Why should we need to wait for scientifically ascertained probabilities as to the occurrence of 
the risk of an infectious disease pandemic in order to determine that this risk is serious 
enough to prevent xenotransplantation from progressing to clinical trials?  If we could 
ascertain that the probability of the risk of such harm occurring was very low, scientific 
rationality would lend itself to the conclusion that the potential benefits of moving to clinical 
trials would outweigh this unlikely risk.
74
  But would and should this be enough to satisfy the 
public?  Even if the risk of an infectious disease pandemic occurring is very low, it is still 
there and it is a risk of severe harm.  Drawing an analogy between the risks of 
xenotransplantation and those posed by nuclear power plants, Daar discusses the low chances 
of ‘China Syndrome’ occurring; a nuclear meltdown with the consequent release of 
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radioactive material into the environment.
75
  Using estimates of quantifiable risks on the basis 
of the probability of accidents, scientists rationalise that this risk is acceptable.
76
  But no 
matter how improbable, were a nuclear meltdown to happen the consequences would be 
devastating, as the Chernobyl Disaster in 1986 demonstrates.
77
  And scientists, of course, 
cannot provide any definite answer as to the probability of a negative outcome occurring, 
with experts frequently failing to reach agreement as to the levels at which hazards posed by 
a biotechnology are acceptable, especially in the context of manufactured risk.  For these 
reasons, demanding that the risks posed by xenotransplantation are assessed as unacceptable 
on the basis of probability in order to halt clinical trials is unreasonable.  But what does this 
mean for an individual who needs a xenotransplant to improve their health, and for the wider 
public health? 
 
IV. INTEREST IN THE HEALTH OF INDIVIDUALS AND XENOTRANSPLANTATION 
A. General 
It is indisputable that the state has an interest in the health of the individuals which comprise 
it and this can mean establishing health care systems which provide appropriate care to those 
in need in a timely manner.  These key aims of the UK’s National Health Service,78 are 
recognised in international conventions and charters.
79
  Framing the individual’s interest in 
health within a rights discourse plays an important role in presenting health as a matter that 
the state is responsible for.  Indeed, ‘[v]iewing health as a fundamental right, part of the 
fabric of democracy and justice, transforms the social and political discourse. The language 
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of ‘rights’ suggests that states have obligations and can be held accountable for violations’.80  
Judicial comments also indicate that such a right is evolving and may be encompassed under 
the right to life in Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 




The interest in individual health has, in some countries, taken on a particular focus.  In the 
UK and the US this interest has translated into a trend of giving legal and ethical priority to 
an individual’s autonomy regarding her health.  However, although Article 8 of the ECHR 
has been held to protect personal autonomy in the shape of a right to bodily integrity,
82
 legal 
recognition of individual rights is not absolute.
83
  The House of Lords and the European 
Court of Human Rights have held that recognition of a personal autonomy right under Article 
8 can take second place to the need to protect the rights of vulnerable others.
84
  The apparent 
precedence given to individual autonomy in bioethics has been critiqued,
85
 and alternative 
presentations of autonomy offered.
86
  Thus although individual interests, personal autonomy 
and rights are legally and ethically recognised, they can sometimes be offset by other public 
and private interests. 
 
B. Applied to xenotransplantation 
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If the state prohibits xenotransplantation, individuals who need a xenotransplant will be 
deprived of a chance of survival.  But we should not assume that an individual’s health will 
be enhanced by a xenotransplant.
87
  Given their experimental nature, they are unlikely to 
bring about a positive outcome for participants in early trials.
88
  McLean and Williamson 
have predicted that ‘it is likely that in any early trials that take place the transplants will fail; 
if the treatment in question is the transplant of a whole organ then it is also likely that the 
patient will die.’89  Ideas of benefit for xeno-recipients have been reinforced by the World 
Health Organization (WHO),
90
 but these ideas do not necessarily mean that the individual’s 
interest will not be served by participation in clinical trials.  Perhaps the would-be participant 
is realistic about her chances of survival.  Her primary reason for involvement is not so much 
prolonging her own life, but saving the lives of others in the future who may face her 
predicament.
91
  Nonetheless, when balancing the individual interest in health against public 
health interests, the likelihood of a positive outcome for the recipient’s health must be taken 
into account.  However, if the validity of prohibiting xenotransplantation on the basis of the 
uncertain risk is challengeable, then so to is permitting it on the basis of uncertain benefit.  
The status quo should thus be respected and xenotransplantation not clinically proceed. 
 
Prohibiting xenotransplantation could be viewed as infringing the autonomy of would-be 
participants by breaching the negative obligation of individual autonomy – ‘autonomous 
actions should not be subjected to controlling constraints by others.’92  However, is agreeing 
to participate in a xenotransplant clinical trial really an affirmative expression of individual 
                                                          
87
 For discussion of the requirement for benefit with regards to xenotransplant clinical trials see S Fovargue, ‘A 




 McLean and Williamson (n 6) at 175. 
90
 ‘First WHO Global Consultation on Regulatory Requirements for Xenotransplantation Clinical Trials, 
Changsha, China, 19-21 November 2008’ (2009) 16 Xenotransplantation 61. 
91
 Fovargue (n 87). 
92
 TL Beauchamp, JF Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 6
th
 ed (2009) Oxford University Press, 104. 
20 
 
autonomy?  In order to fulfil the positive obligation of autonomy, which requires ‘[r]espectful 
treatment in disclosing information and actions that foster autonomous decision making’,93 
the surgeon performing the xenotransplant must provide the necessary information for a 
person to make an informed decision.  This will not be easy given the limited information 
available on xenotransplantation. And an individual consenting to participate in a 
xenotransplant trial might not be truly exercising individual autonomy because it will lead to 
such a severe infringement of their personal autonomy in the future.
94
  Is it possible to give 
fully informed consent to as-of-yet unexperienced severe liberty limiting measures which 
could include a lifelong surveillance and monitoring regime, remaining within it, refraining 
from having children, and compulsory post-mortems?
95
  The law does not require an 
individual to have experienced treatments and health care options to give a fully informed 
refusal to them,
96
 but the situation here is very different.  In xenotransplantation the 
individual is consenting to a medical intervention which will lead to unexperienced 
potentially severe lifelong restrictions on liberty.  Other issues arise in relation to the nature 
of enforcement and sanctions for non-compliance, and also whether contacts of the xeno-
recipient should be required to consent to it and comply with such a regime.
97
  Even taking 
into account individual interests and autonomy, xenotransplantation has serious implications 
for the xeno-recipient, their contacts and the wider public.  We thus contend that there are 
some things which are ‘inherently wrong – that is, wrong no matter how much good could 
come from doing [them]’,98 and that xenotransplantation falls into this category. 
 
V. INTERESTS IN PUBLIC HEALTH, THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC AND XENOTRANSPLANTATION 
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There are various definitions of ‘public health’ and the UK’s Faculty of Public Health 
suggests that, amongst other things, it ‘emphasises collective responsibility for health, its 
protection and disease prevention”.99  It may thus be in society’s interest for the state to take 
preventative action to protect public health.  This interest in public health not only imposes a 
significant burden on the state but also lends support to ideas of a collective right to public 
health or, at the very least, an expectation that the state will take necessary measures to 
ensure it.  Whilst rights to health have not been explicitly recognised in English law, 
international and European conventions recognise the importance of health in general terms 
and set out States’ obligations in respect of health.100  There are also domestic legal 
provisions, powers and duties under which actions taken in order to protect the health of the 
population can be based.
101
  And English law recognises that there are situations where public 
health can legitimate action that will hinder an individual’s interests when this action is taken 




Public health thus cares about individuals as themselves because a population is healthy only 
if those within it are ‘relatively free from injury and disease’.103  However, its ‘abiding 
interest is in the well-being and security of populations, not individual patients’.104  As such, 
it can bring into conflict private and public rights.
105
  Nevertheless, there is a sense that the 
state can and should take action in certain situations in the name of public health, such as the 
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implementation of measures to remove causes of ill health and prevent epidemic diseases.  




B. Applied to xenotransplantation 
Interest in public health requires the state to take measures to remove causes of ill health and 
prevent epidemic diseases and it could demand a precautionary, evidence-based approach to 
xenotransplantation. In fulfilling its obligations and responsibility to the public, the UK state 
might have a duty to ban xenotransplantation because of the significant risk of harm to health 
it poses. Failure to prohibit xenotransplantation arguably means the state would knowingly be 
permitting the public’s exposure to serious risks which cannot currently be quantified and 
thus controlled or appropriately managed. Conversely, the public interest in health could 
require the state to encourage xenotransplantation to save or prolong individual lives, as less 
suffering and ill health is beneficial to the wider community and the health of us all, and if 
xenotransplantation is successful the shortage of organs could be resolved, making resources 
available for other treatments. 
 
Yet just because there are possible gains for public health and individual interests, this does 
not mean that it should be automatically assumed that xenotransplantation will and should 
proceed to clinical trial.  A parallel can be drawn with reproductive cloning.  As another new 
science, public health may have benefited from the introduction of an additional method of 
combating infertility, and the individual interest in having a biologically related child would 
have been served by its clinical application.  Notwithstanding this, reproductive cloning 
remains unlawful in the UK.
107
  The prohibition is undoubtedly in part because reproductive 
cloning is a symbolic wrong that seems to violate the value of respect for human life and 
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 but a further justification is the potential harm to the clone due to birth defects.
109
  
That it is unclear how likely the occurrence of this harm would be, as with 
xenotransplantation, has not prevented such prohibition, perhaps because there is a real risk 




Even if xenotransplantation could solve the organ shortage, the potential public health 
benefits would need to outweigh the risks to justify going ahead with it – the condition of 
proportionality.
111
  This is hard to satisfy.  Societal public health is likely to suffer more of a 
detriment from the severity of the potential risk of an infectious disease pandemic than the 
benefit potentially achieved through increased organs available for transplantation.
112
  
Everyone in society is placed at risk of a pandemic by allowing xenotransplantation to 
proceed.  As a consequence, society’s infrastructure might collapse; indeed, we have been 
living with this possibility since early 2009 with regard to the global swine flu pandemic.  In 
the UK, for example, many businesses and organisations, including universities, have drawn 
up contingency plans in the event that individuals are infected.  The risk of a pandemic 
caused by xenotransplantation and its possible impact can be contrasted with the limited 
negative impact on public health caused by the shortage of organs for transplantation.  
Without minimising or being unsympathetic to the harm that those requiring a 
(xeno)transplant may suffer, it is the health of a limited number in society which is directly 
affected, rather than society’s capacity to function.  Applying lesser harms reasoning, the 
health of the more limited number in society should be outweighed by the risk of harm posed 
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by moving forward with xenotransplantation.  This argument is strengthened by applying the 
precautionary principle modified by the harm principle. 
 
VI. A PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH  
The precautionary principle, most often used in environmental policy, essentially holds that 
‘where there are threats of serious and irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.’113  Although there is no one agreed definition of it, the precautionary principle 
is underpinned by a number of key ideas.  First, that ‘when faced with an unknowable and 
unquantifiable risk that cannot be ruled out, actions should be taken in advance to minimize 
that risk’.114  The principle is thus directed at anticipation rather than cure.115  The common 
sense themes of ‘if in doubt, err on the side of caution’ and ‘it’s better to be safe than sorry’ 
are also identifiable in the different conceptions of the principle.  If the principle is used to 
determine public policy, then morally unacceptable harms which may result from human 
actions should be avoided or diminished.  Even if the harms are uncertain, ‘it is sufficient that 
they be scientifically plausible’.116  The WHO has described the principle as ‘a risk 
management policy applied in circumstances with a high degree of scientific uncertainty, 
reflecting the need to take action for a potentially serious risk without awaiting the results of 
scientific research.’117  It thus enables regulators to constrain or prohibit risky technology, 
even in circumstances where the risks are scientifically uncertain and other factors might 
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suggest a different regulatory approach.
118
  The element of uncertainty is ‘a sine qua non 
condition to the application and even to the legitimacy of the precautionary principle’.119 
 
Whilst the principle itself is contested and has been criticised for being, amongst other things, 
ill-defined, absolutist and marginalising science,
120
 it may be of use in balancing the different 
interests in public health because it recognises aspects of each of these interests.  For 
example, the idea that decisions can be made in order to benefit or protect the many, as 
occurs under the amended Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984,
121
 can be seen in the 
precautionary principle which promotes the curtailment of actions that pose a significant risk 
of harm to community interests.
122
  The principle acknowledges that account should be taken 
of damage to individuals along with that to the public and future generations,
123
 and 
inherently recognises the importance of advances in science and medicine, by focusing on 
appropriate responses to such developments which may harm human and environmental 
health.  If it did not, it would advocate that uncertainty about risk equates to a moratorium on 
advances, and it categorically does not do this.
124
  As Resnik argues, provided the threats 
under consideration are plausible and the precautionary measures adopted reasonable, the 
precautionary principle is not unscientific nor does it marginalise the role of science, the 
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This means that in situations where there are recognised harms to human health but the extent 
of those harms is not known, as with most clinical trials, then the person proposing the trial 
has the burden of proof with regards to risks, and immediate action is required in order to 
forestall potentially serious consequences to health in the future.
126
  Andorno comments: 
 
in view of the possibility of serious harmful effects …  it is not acceptable just to say: 
‘we cannot be sure that serious damage will happen, so we will do nothing to prevent 
it.’  If there are good reasons, based on empirical evidence or plausible causal 
hypothesis, to believe that damage might occur, and given the crucial importance of 
what is at stake (the life and health of people …), adequate measure should be taken 




In this way, the precautionary principle expands the harm principle so that it encompasses 
public goods and possible harm to future generations.
128
  Mill’s harm principle thus supports 
our argument that in some situations (xenotransplantation being one) a precautionary 
approach influenced by the harm principle, should prevail. 
 
VII. THE HARM PRINCIPLE 
Under Mill’s harm principle, it is only appropriate to constrain an individual’s liberty through 
law or moral coercion if the individual’s behaviour causes harm to others.  As individuals are 
sovereign over their own lives, any outside intervention into their lives and liberty can only 
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be justified if they act in a way that damages others.
129
  The notion of harm is thus central and 
Mill refers to acts which are ‘injurious to others,’ giving as examples ‘[e]ncroachment of 
their rights; infliction on them of any loss or damage not justified by his own rights; 
falsehood or duplicity in dealing with them; unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over 
them; even selfish abstinence from defending them against injury’.130  Such conduct can lead 
to moral reprobation when it involves a breach of duty to others,
131
 but it is only when an 
individual violates others’ rights that she should be punished by law.132  However, Mill seems 
prepared to expand the harm principle further and refers to offences occurring in public that 
‘are a violation of good manners’, with offences against decency an example.133  He did not 
explain why such offences are harmful, so this construct of harm is open to broad 
interpretation.  But it is clear that Mill did not allow for other concerns, such as moralism or 




Feinberg has clarified the character of harm in his refinement of Mill’s avoidance of harm 
theory, and suggests there are two notions of harm: harm as a setback to an interest and harm 
as a wrong.  Harm occurs in the form of a setback to someone’s interests if one individual’s 
behaviour thwarts another’s interest thereby leaving it ‘in a worse condition than it would 
otherwise have been in had the invasion not occurred at all’.135  Interests are “things in which 
one has a stake” and which are vital to an individual’s well-being.136  Harm as a wrong 
occurs when an individual wrongs another or treats her unjustly; ‘[o]ne person wrongs 
another when his indefensible (unjustifiable and inexcusable) conduct violates the other’s 
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right’.137  When applying the harm principle, only harms which fit into both categories can 
legitimate legal prohibition of conduct.
138
  Feinberg’s interpretation of the harm principle 
thus provides greater insight into the form of harmful behaviour that may justify legal 
intervention by the criminal law. 
 
Mill’s thesis is applicable to established, ‘certain’ concrete risks and behaviour that creates a 
risk of harm, because he includes behaviour that poses a ‘definite risk of damage’ within the 
remit of his harm principle.
139
  However, extending the harm principle to a risk of future 
harm makes its application less straightforward.  How can we possibly know all the 
consequences that will emerge from our actions before we have acted?  And if we also 
consider potential harm, will this distort and exaggerate the harm principle?
140
  It has been 
suggested that it may be difficult to definitely ascertain that conduct poses no significant risk 
of future harm,
141
 and that it may be so easy now to formulate arguments predicated upon 
harm that the harm principle has collapsed in on itself.
142
  We disagree, but accept that 
caution must be taken when addressing harm claims in order to ensure that the harm principle 
remains sufficiently defined and restrictive.  It is important to note that although often viewed 
through the lens of individual autonomy, there is no reason why Mill’s harm theory cannot 
operate in the context of public health.
143
  In fact, it would arguably detract from Mill’s 
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utilitarian outlook if the harm principle could not function in a way that would allow 




VIII. APPLYING A PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH ALONGSIDE THE HARM PRINCIPLE TO THE RISKS 
OF XENOTRANSPLANTATION 
To recap, we use risk to refer to the possible negative outcomes of xenotransplantation and 
the probability of these outcomes occurring.  On the basis of the available evidence, moving 
to clinical trials presents uncertain risks of a grave nature, the main one being an infectious 
disease pandemic.  Xenotransplantation poses manufactured risks, risks created by scientific 
progress and of which we have no prior experience; thus calculating the probability of their 
occurrence is especially difficult.  Applying lesser harms logic, the risks posed by 
xenotransplantation should be lower than the risks of organ failure that it is designed to treat. 
Although an individual in need of a xenotransplant may die without one, the fact that 
xenotransplantation poses risks to others besides the recipient must be taken into account 
when weighing up the seriousness of risk.  Finally, even if it were possible to ascertain that 
the probability of the risk of an infectious disease pandemic is very low, because of the 
serious nature of this risk, this does not make the risk acceptable. 
 
Therefore, as xenotransplantation poses real risks of harm, and liberal and more collective 
concerns are relevant, we propose that the precautionary principle informed by the harm 
principle should be used as a guide to ascertain whether public health should be prioritised 
over an individual’s health, even in a life prolonging situation.  We have set out the key 
components of the precautionary principle – acting in advance of scientifically certain and 
established risks, anticipating risks and minimising them but not necessarily eradicating 
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them, and seeking to protect existing and future generations.  These and other elements are all 
necessarily involved in clinical trials because until a drug or other intervention is tested on a 
human, the risks can never be known with any certainty.  Educated predictions can be made, 
based on pre-clinical data, but the first clinical trial participant will, to some extent, always be 
taking a leap of faith.
145
  Because of this, most countries regulate clinical trials, an example of 
the precautionary principle in practice.  So what of xenotransplantation clinical trials - are 
these so different to other such trials?  The information presented earlier suggests they are, 
because of the potential risk and harm that may be caused to the xeno-recipient and others, 
nationally and globally.  We do not have to wait for the risks or harms to materialise in order 
to justify acting to protect others, particularly where the effects of doing so may be so 
catastrophic; rather, the precautionary principle supports, and maybe even requires, 
anticipatory action.  The harm principle, concerned as it is with individuals and others who 
may be harmed by the actions of the individual, supports curtailing the use of 
xenotransplantation and other developing biotechnologies requiring a similar weighing of 
private benefit and public risk.  The harm principle would not, however, permit state 
intervention to prevent an individual from accepting a xenotransplant (assuming clinical trials 
proceed) on the basis of the potential harm her actions may cause to herself. Such 
paternalistic intervention would violate the principle.
146
  But if xenotransplantation endangers 
public health, the harm principle justifies state intervention to prevent its practice.  
  
But what about the fact that as we can never know all of the consequences of our actions 
before we act, the harm principle could prohibit almost any medical advance?  This argument 
                                                          
145
 See, for example, the disastrous results of the TGN1412 trial at Northwick Park in 2006: Expert Scientific 
Group, Expert Scientific Group on Phase One Clinical Trials: Final Report (2006): 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_073165.p
df;  Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Authority, Investigations into Adverse Incidents during 
Clinical Trials of TGN1412 (2006): http://www.mhra.gov.uk. 
146
 Mill (n 129), at 78. 
31 
 
is especially relevant to us as the consequences of accepting a xenotransplant are unclear and 
likely to remain so until a genetically engineered solid pig organ is xenotransplanted into a 
human.  Even then, we might have to wait for a number of (unspecified) years in order to 
monitor any harms following from that xenotransplant.  We can say that xenotransplantation 
poses a real risk of future harm; it is the nature and severity of that harm which is 
unquantifiable.  But, in assessing the level of risk, it is difficult to evaluate the nature and 
duration of the risk, the probability of the harm occurring, and the severity of it regarding 
xenotransplantation.
147
 But, ‘it is [also] not possible to ascertain with any certainty that the 
risks posed to public health are small’.148  Whilst a more specific potential harm to the public 
is identified to justify breaching confidentiality,
149
 for example, it is likely to be harm of a 
smaller magnitude (in terms of the number of people who might be exposed to a risk of 
serious harm or death) than the possible harm to health posed by xenotransplantation.  And it 
is less problematic to apply the harm principle when the harm is concrete and ascertainable, 




The fact that the identified potential harm to ‘vulnerable’ individuals was not concrete and 
easily measurable did not prevent the European Court of Human Rights from finding that it 
should outweigh Dianne Pretty’s personal autonomy under Article 8.151  Thus, applying the 
harm principle to xenotransplantation results in a prohibition on clinical trials because of the 
potential severity of harm that could be caused to public health.  Feinberg’s presentation of 
harm leads to a similar conclusion, as allowing clinical xenotransplantation creates the danger 
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of harm in the sense of a setback to individuals’ interests if the risk of an infectious disease 
materialises.  Furthermore, unless everyone at potential risk consents, it would also amount to 
harm in the sense of a wrong as it would violate others’ right to consent. 
 
Although researchers and potential xeno-recipients only intend to preserve life and not harm 
others, they are arguably reckless given the risk of harm that providing and accepting a 
xenotransplant creates, and should be brought to account for this.
152
  Researchers’ have a 
responsibility to others besides the potential xeno-recipient,
153
 and ‘it could be argued that the 
numerous studies showing the possibility of widespread viral outbreaks prove such injury 
was reasonably foreseeable to the companies, medical centers and individuals performing 
xenotransplantation.’154  We could add research ethics committees to this list as such a 
committee would be involved in the decision as to whether a xenotransplant clinical trial was 




An exception on the basis of harm being caused for a legitimate reason, such as self defence, 
can be recognised under the harm principle;
156
 but the preservation of the xenotransplant 
recipient’s life cannot be a legitimate reason to run the risk of causing harm to countless 
others.  Ensuring the health of the greatest number must outweigh the potential benefit of 
saving one individual life.  Given the current pre-clinical evidence on xenotransplantation, an 
assessment of the possible benefits to the recipient and public health and the risk to public 
health, must lean towards prohibiting xenotransplantation.  Reassurance that such a risk does 
not exist is not provided by the current scientific evidence.  Moreover, once 
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xenotransplantation clinically proceeds it is impossible to guarantee that public health is not 
at risk and the danger of disease transfer and a pandemic moves from theoretical to real.  And 
if they actualise it will be too late. 
 
The public interest in health thus offers a powerful reason for state interference to prohibit 
xenotransplantation.  Combining the precautionary principle with the harm principle means 
that if the actions of medical researchers harm or, crucially, might harm others, then it is 
legitimate for the State to intervene.  This does not mean that prohibition is the only option; 
rather, the level of the intervention is context specific; regulation and moratoriums are 
amongst the possibilities.  But for xenotransplantation we argue that prohibition is currently 
most appropriate.  Mill argued that there will be cases where state intervention is not 
justified, despite the fact that an individual’s actions have caused harm.157  Current available 
evidence suggests xenotransplantation poses potential for serious harm to public health, so 
the harm principle should be applied more forcefully to prevent clinical trials proceeding.  In 
the context of xenotransplantation the harm principle thus becomes a liberty limiting rather 
than liberty enhancing principle.  A biotechnology like xenotransplantation requires that the 
precedence given to an individual interest in health in some societies is challenged, and 
individual interests take second place to a more communitarian, public health approach. 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Xenotransplantation will pose an infection risk to the individual recipient and may unleash 
unknown and unidentifiable diseases into the population, but an accurate assessment of this 
risk cannot occur until genetically engineered pig solid organs are xenotransplanted into 
humans and even then due to the latency of some diseases, such an assessment may be 
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delayed for many years and hampered by the diagnostic tools currently available.  But society 
has to decide in advance whether the benefit some individuals may obtain from a 
xenotransplant outweighs the burdens the wider public will have to bear.  Making such a 
decision will not be easy, not only because of this lack of information but also because of 
difficulties in interpreting the information which does exist.  For example, statements that 
there is no evidence of PERV infection may mean there is no evidence of this so far, but can 




Given the impossibility of measuring the risks of xenotransplantation and the “histories of 
lentiviruses and prions have taught us about the untameable distances between the laboratory, 
the spread of infectious diseases and public health”,159 a better approach would be to avoid 
taking the risk to ensure that needless harm is not created.
160
  This may seem unnecessarily 
precautionary but as there are alternatives to xenotransplantation including reforming existing 
allotransplant recovery systems and structures and the promise of stem cells,
161
 there is no 
need to create this risk in the first place.  In the light of the limited pre-clinical survival times, 
uncertainty as to the ability of genetically engineered pig organs to support human life, the 
potentially catastrophic risks, and the difficulties in identifying, managing and controlling 
those risks, it is unclear why some still view xenotransplantation as a viable solution to the 
shortage of organs.
162
  In this environment, the public interest in health and state obligations 
to protect public health require the state to prohibit clinical xenotransplantation. 
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